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Distant intimacy: Space, drones, and just war 
 
John Williams 
Accepted for publication in Ethics & International Affairs published by Cambridge University 
Press. The paper will appear in revised form in the spring 2015 issue. The published paper is 
copyright Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Carnegie Council for Ethics in 
International Affairs. 
 
This article considers how space, understood conceptually and informed by political 
geography, affects the ethics of targeted killing facilitated by drones. A more sophisticated 
understanding of space, via an account of its political construction and ethical significance, 
identifies an important gap in how ethical debates about the use of armed drones have 
developed and why it is that efforts to contain the debate about drones within established just 
war categories and principles is insufficient . The article develops the idea of “distant 
intimacy”1 to reveal just war theory’s limited appreciation of space as an ethical concept, the 
spatial distinctiveness of the relationship between drone operators and their targets, and why 
this space is poorly recognised in just war-based debates about drone strikes. Critical 
engagement with the concept of space, rooted in political geography, augments established 
ethical critiques of drone strikes rooted in the radical distancing of operators from their targets 
and the opportunity operators possess to acquire intimate knowledge of their targets’ lives. 
Bringing this spatial perspective to bear establishes how the cumulative effect of a number 
of differences of degree in the impact of drones on just war-based ethical analysis of their 
use establishes distinctive, but largely unconsidered, ethical relationships. As drone use 
grows it is crucial that ethical assessment adapts to the distinctive spatial relationship between 
drone operators and their targets.  
The article proceeds with a brief consideration of two well-studied components of 
this debate: the ethical significance of distance and technology’s ability to grant drone 
operators intimate knowledge of the lives of their targets, contributing to the ability of 
operators to fulfil jus in bello requirements. Subsequently, I look at how this establishes the 
importance of space as an analytical category, suggesting this is badly neglected in just war 
thinking, and how critical political geography can assist. The construction of asymmetric 
space is crucial here, connecting to debates about the spaces of asymmetrical warfare, with 
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the emergenceof “dronespace” instantiating the highly distinctive and radically asymmetrical 
relationship of “distant intimacy” between operator and target. Within dronespace, two central 
elements of just war theory’s understanding of ethical subjectivity—autonomy and 
reciprocity—are radically reworked such that the ethical relationship of operator and target 
becomes exclusively one-directional. The ostensible ability of drones to enhance compliance 
with central aspects of the just war tradition’s account of the ethical use of violence are 
subverted by the construction of radical asymmetry, establishing distant intimacy as ethically 
problematic. 
 
DISTANCE 
The deployment of drones
2
 for airstrikes since 2002 has inspired a substantial literature
3
 
Drones’ military effectiveness, legality and ability to fulfil ethical requirements, amongst 
other topics are prominent.
4
 Those three foci interact and are observable from different 
perspectives: for instance, the debate over whether targeted killing is an act of war or 
extrajudicial execution.
5
 One common feature is whether the radical distancing between the 
drone’s pilot and their target is ethically significant. Distancing operators of a weapons 
system from their target is nothing new. From ancient methods, such as spears, slings, bows 
and catapults, through firearms and artillery, to intercontinental ballistic missiles, being 
increasingly distant from one’s target has been an everyday military experience for a long 
time. A drone is no different from other long-range missile systems, on this basis, except that 
it is not destroyed in the attack and can return to base for re-use.
6
 The potential for distance 
to reduce constraints on the use of force, weakening jus ad bellum restrictions, is well 
known, and often asserted in relation to drones.7 Similarly, a second ethical concern over 
distance is widely appreciated. Invulnerability via distance is not novel. What is today called 
“force protection” is a longstanding legitimate concern well-served by reducing the necessity 
for hand-to-hand combat by increasing the distance from one’s adversary, especially via a 
technology the adversary cannot readily counter.
8
 Weapons have been described as 
“distancing technologies,”9 and drones clearly confer very great advantages. Current drone 
operators enjoy effective invulnerability from physical attack by those they target, or their 
allies, raising concern that physical detachment from the experience of combat may render 
it ‘easier’ to countenance.10The harms drone operators face cluster around emotional and 
psychological damage associated with their operations, including that associated with the 
level of knowledge they gain about those targeted, and arising from the psychological 
disjuncture between intense and stressful operations juxtaposed with returning immediately to 
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everyday domestic life. Levels of mental health problems faces by drone operators are 
comparable to those of conventional combat pilots.
11
 
Drone pilots enjoy additional benefits in force protection terms: Power projection 
combined with force-protection enables military operations in environments too hostile or too 
logistically challenging to sustain deployment of human beings or the use of inhabited 
weapons systems. Strawser argues for the moral “duty to employ uninhabited aerial vehicles” 
where that reduces risk to humans pursuing justified operations and where UAV use does not 
compromise compliance with discrimination and proportionality.
12
 Asa Kasher goes further 
states have a moral obligation to use technology to protect their citizens serving in the armed 
forces even when this increases risks to what he labels “enemy civilians.”13 The concerns 
about distance reducing moral inhibitions to initiate and conduct military operations are 
therefore different to some, limited, extent in the case of drone use when compared with 
other, more familiar, distancing technologies, such as artillery, aircraft and missile systems.  
Enjoyment of the force protection benefits brought by distance relies on asymmetry 
between the military capability of those deploying drones and their adversaries. Current 
armed drones, the MQ-9 Reaper and MQ-1 Predator, fly comparatively slowly, have limited 
maneuverability and are not significantly protected by stealth technology or defensive 
electronic warfare systems. They would be comparatively easy targets for the air force of 
middle-ranking technological powers or groups with access to modern surface-to-air missiles 
or high quality anti-aircraft artillery. That will, and is, changing. The U.S. Air Force possesses 
remotely piloted F-16s to enhance the verisimilitude of pilot training, enabling combat 
practice against “the real thing.” It is not hard to envisage alternative roles for a Mach 2/9-G–
capable drone with a substantial weapons payload should the US Air Force operate in more 
symmetrical combat environments than the skies above Afghanistan.
14
  
This crude summary of the distance element of the argument explains why some 
dismiss the purported novelty of drones because of the distance between operator and target.
15
 
The challenges distance poses to and within just war theory are consequently well known. 
Within jus in bello, distance typically reduces accuracy, increasing the challenge of 
discrimination. Distance can encourage use of more destructive weapons and tactics, because 
those deploying them do not suffer their immediate effects, challenging proportionality. 
Within jus ad bellum, distance may make states more willing to go to war, believing that 
conducting war at a distance will insulate them from its consequences, causing them to lower 
the prudential thresholds of proportionality and reasonable prospects of success, and perhaps 
even to reinterpret and expand the principle of just cause to include principles and cases that 
would not be pursued if war was conducted at close quarters.
16
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INTIMACY 
Typically, the discussion of jus in bello aspects of drone use suggests drones can be 
accommodated within existing accounts of just war theory.
17
 What is at stake is whether 
drones enable more effective observation of discrimination and proportionality in comparison 
with alternative weapons, under conditions prevailing in the area of operations and with due 
regard to other relevant considerations. Typically, debate focuses on whether those killed by 
drones are accurately identified as legitimate targets (the discrimination issue) and whether 
“collateral damage” from drone strikes is defensible in relation to the military advantage 
gained through these operations (the proportionality principle). Advocates of drones argue 
that they present significant advantages in relation to discrimination and proportionality, 
resulting from the superior quality of information about targets that drones provide and the 
improved quality of decision-making they permit.
18
  
A somewhat different, but complementary, approach is offered by Coeckelbergh, 
whose phenomenological approach to the ethics of drone use stresses the moral psychology of 
combat and the relationship between intimacy – including physical intimacy – and restraint in 
combat.
19
 The notion of intimacy is also raised by Shaw20 and can be considered in relation to 
the claims about improved information and decision-making. That drones enable acquisition 
of more and better information about targets than most alternative tactics seems quite clear. 
Alternatives, such as ground surveillance teams, which could be superior, carry considerable 
costs in terms of logistical challenges and increased risks to team members operating in 
hostile environments. While this article focuses on armed drones, recall that the development 
of drones, and the overwhelming majority of contemporary drone deployment, is driven by 
“ISR”—intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The much-touted “long loiter” 
capability of drones means they can sustain surveillance of possible targets for extended 
periods of time, potentially days or even weeks. The quality of the sensory arrays that drones 
deploy means more and better data can be analyzed to increase the probability that the person 
targeted is correctly identified and meets the criteria of permissible target.
21
 As Mark 
Coeckelbergh argues, drones have begun to reverse the “de-facing” associated with distance, 
restoring to some extent the intimate connection between drone operators and their targets.
22
 
Prefiguring subsequent claims to some extent, this partial restoration of intimacy is 
asymmetric: only the drone operator gains insight into the life of his adversary, sees his face, 
and witnesses his pain and death.  
In relation to intimacy’s second element – decision-making – the remote location of 
drone operators means that ideally data can be assessed free from pressures, risks and 
stresses affecting members of a ground surveillance team or a pilot engaging the target. 
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Furthermore, drone operators share data with colleagues and commanders, in real time, 
enabling collaborative decision-making properly informed by a range of expertise. This 
idealised image of experienced, dedicated, well-informed professionals making measured, 
calm, well-reasoned decisions about whether they have sufficient information to be 
confident they have correctly identified their target, that the target is a permissible one and 
to then chose their moment to attack in order to minimise collateral damage is at the heart 
of most advocacy of drone strikes as an ethically superior way of war.23 
Furthermore, drones’ sensory arrays are augmented by additional information 
sources, potentially in real-time, or close to it. Advanced network analysis software enables 
data from the drone to be cross-checked against other sources, and used to augment those 
sources, building up a more detailed picture of how the targeted individual may fit into a 
wider network, building connections between “persons of interest” and bringing others, 
previously unidentified, into view. As Grayson suggests, it brings about the potential, “to 
immediately locate, position and track persons of interest across a governmental environment 
that is being conceived on a planetary scale.”24 Communication intercepts, human intelligence 
from agents and informants, analysis of patterns of life all play into confirming, or not, the 
permissibility of targeting an individual. This offers a level of discrimination unimaginable 
twenty years ago.
25
 This is allied to more proportionate use of force by reducing collateral 
damage, something likely to go further as munitions with smaller payloads are deployed with 
greater precision and the quality of software systems modelling the effects of different 
weapons systems improves.
26
  
This is the intimacy of drone strikes I wish to focus on:, a previously largely 
unavailable level of specifically personal information about an individual’s identity and their 
life, save via expensive, uncertain, and dangerous operations infiltrating agents into an 
individual’s life or “turning” an existing member of their social network at great personal risk 
to the informant. “Signature strikes” that identify targets through patterns of behaviour 
rather than specific information about named individuals also display intimacy. Associating 
in some way with “known militants,” repeatedly crossing certain borders, being present in 
certain areas at specific times, being caught by a drone’s cameras engaging in suspicious 
activity can all, in combination, be enough to single someone out for targeting. The intimacy 
of drone strikes displays ethically significant claims about the personalization of targeting, 
involving a complex mix of ostensibly individualized responsibility for actual or potential 
acts “beyond the forms of ‘legitimate’ political activity.”27 Personalized strikes, however, 
involve  
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the decontextualisation of the killing from the broader conflict by focusing upon 
the claimed characteristics of the specific person killed. The individual is found 
to be deserving of such a death not just because of their potential capabilities, but 
also due to their perceived intentions being considered uncivil. Being targeted is 
therefore an indicator that one has been primarily determined to be an 
illegitimate political subject rather than an important one.
28
  
 
This suggests a deeper critique than debate over the numbers of “high value targets,” 
“low-level militants,” and “civilians” killed by drones. Geographical contextualization of 
intimacy highlights that an individual’s status within the wider conflict is only one part of this 
issue. Being singled out for killing is an act of spatial intimacy, and—for one of the parties – 
the drone operator—may involve the restoration of a mediated phenomenological intimacy of 
combat that, rather the “screening” the killer from the killed, can restore a facsimile of the 
visceral personal experience of previous forms of combat.
29
 The reality of drone strikes 
departs from this ideal.30 The reality of life always departs from the ideal. The wrong people 
are killed by drones. Intelligence failures occur, attacks are mistimed or misdirected, and 
operators make mistakes.
31
 That, alone, is insufficient reason to dismiss the ethical 
defensibility of drone strikes. If drone use results in more of the wrong people being killed 
than would otherwise be the case, then we have a reason for skepticism about the positive 
portrayal of the ethics of drone strikes. The evidence for reaching that conclusion with 
confidence, however, is simply unavailable. Counting and classifying the victims of drone 
strikes is hampered by unreliable data, something notably worsened by the failure of the 
United States, as the world’s leading user of armed drones, to make available its own data 
about the outcome of drone strikes, especially those conducted by the CIA.
32
  
This problem is exacerbated by the necessarily speculative nature of comparative 
analyses of discrimination and proportionality. U.S. counterterrorism operations in Pakistan 
or elsewhere cannot be replicated deploying different techniques—drones, manned aircraft or 
Special Forces teams, for instance—each time. Avery Plaw estimates drones are better in 
terms of discrimination than the plausible alternatives, and are better at killing “high value 
targets.” His account seems plausible and measured, and, to move forward with the debate, I 
accept his assertions for the time being.
33
 Clearly, there is more to be done here, and work 
would be greatly aided by the U. S. government complying with the United Nations’ request 
for release of data.
34
 Drones grant exceptional intimacy, but the full extent of that knowledge, 
including what happens once the trigger is pulled, is publicly unavailable, despite being 
collected. These initial observations about distance and intimacy do not resolve debate about 
whether drones are “ethical” in relation to just war theory’s usual criteria of discrimination 
and proportionality, or in relation to the extent to which they excessively privilege force 
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protection. Instead, summarizing two familiar elements of contemporary debate about drones 
sets the scene for considering neglect of the concept of space. Turning, necessarily briefly, to 
political geography reveals the insight available from addressing this neglect, helping 
establish the asymmetry of distant intimacy and its consequent ethical particularity.  
 
SPACE 
 
Space is a central topic in political geography, but almost totally neglected in just war 
theory as a subject of conscious enquiry. It is worth noting that the reciprocal treatment of just 
war theory in political geography is not an edifying spectacle.
35
 Critical political geographers 
have long been interested in how spatial terms and concepts construct political understanding 
and representations that “frame” political phenomena.36 Critical assessment of these 
phenomena reveal power structures inherent in language describing political space, 
privileging certain discourses over others, politicizing and depoliticizing certain forms of 
space, and protecting certain interests. Representations of political space, through maps, is 
one familiar instance of this, with cartography being far more than a neutral, technical 
exercise. Derek Gregory notes as cartographic reason falters and military violence is loosed 
from its frames, the conventional ties between war and geography have come undone …. 
[L]ate modern war is being transformed by the slippery spaces within which and through 
which it is being conducted.”37 Niva highlights how targeted killing as a key component of 
contemporary US networked warfighting, ‘[does] not so much move across static borders as 
render them contingent, producing proliferating “grey areas” in which violence is largely 
disappeared from media coverage and political accountability.’38 He discusses the role of 
drones in ‘networked shadow warfare … that could be delinked from conventional military 
battlespace and extended across new cartographies.’39 Elden explores political geography’s 
engagement with the vertical dimensions of political space, to include height and depth 
above and below the ground, with major implications for geographical engagement with 
security issues, much of it driven by concern for and with airpower, in which drones are 
prominent.40 “battlespace” is ubiquitous in military discourse, replacing the two-dimensional 
“battlefield” with a self-consciously four-dimensional concept, adding time and depth to 
breadth and length.
41
 Furthermore, battlespace can include cyberspace: a battlespace can be 
anywhere and everywhere, real and virtual.
42
 The notion of a “seamless” battlespace—across 
which drones, Special Forces, intelligence operatives, and other, more conventional, military 
elementsrange in integrated operations— displays this altered spatiality. The ability to frame 
space in this way, and to design and deploy military assets effectively within it, reinforces the 
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asymmetry that has dominated U.S. military experience since Vietnam. The technological 
sophistication, symbolized by the idea of the Revolution in Military Affairs as enabling the 
United States to escape the spatial and temporal confines affecting less advanced (and less 
well-resourced) militaries, has conferred immense technological advantage. Converting that 
into military success has, of course, been rather harder.  
Just war’s traditional categories remain connected to the Clausewitzian paradigm of 
war as analogous to a duel, both in micro-terms of individual engagements and macro-terms 
of the relationship between the parties. Asymmetry challenges the duel metaphor’s ability to 
ground ethical assessment. Coeckelbergh highlights this in terms of a phenomenological 
ethics indebted to Heidegger and Levinas focused on epistemic relations, but it applies 
equally to more familiar just war approaches.43 The technologically mediated asymmetric 
battlespace produces the distant intimacy of drone strikes as a very particular ethical 
relationship. This reinforces asymmetry and adds to the potential for ethical assessment of 
the use of military force via posing questions about the spatial production of ethical 
subjectivity. The ethical status of individuals becomes dependent on their location in 
battlespace, which, in the case of drone operators and targets, takes a very distinctive form 
that warps the usual account of the relationship between physical and emotional distance.  
Moving beyond Coeckelbergh’s account of this process, though, critical geographical 
appreciation helps to reveal how just war theory’s under-developed account of space—its 
reliance on the Clausewitzian metaphor—creates ethical asymmetry such that the ethical 
subjectivity of drone targets becomes entirely dependent on the construction of space by 
those targeting them. 
This brief summary of one aspect of political geography’s critique of space 
challenges conventional debates about the legal classification of sovereign, territorial space. 
For instance, Mary O’Connell argues that the use of drones in Pakistan is illegal because the 
United States is not in an armed conflict with Pakistan. International law therefore does not 
permit the United States to deploy lethal force, even with Pakistani consent.  Afghanistan, as 
a zone of armed conflict, is a different matter.
44
 The border marks a sharp legal divide 
between a zone of armed conflict, where drone strikes are permissible, and a zone where 
drone strikes are necessarily illegal. Other lawyers are less clear-cut, but still see the legal 
classification of territory as crucial to the legality of drone strikes.
45
 Gregory argues focusing 
on legality “works to marginalise ethics and politics by making available a seemingly neutral, 
objective language: disagreement and debate then become purely technical issues that involve 
matters of opinion, certainly, but not values.”46 Grayson concurs, noting that “not only does 
the incorporation of legal frameworks provide an extra-strategic legitimating rationale for 
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targeted killing, but the resort to the complexities of the law potentially de-politicizes the 
practice by presenting its acceptability as a technical question for legal experts.”47 
Deploying static, sovereign boundaries to define the legality of drone strikes is 
challenged by the Obama administration which, as with its predecessor, maintains the 
argument that the United States is engaged in armed conflict with terrorist groups located in 
and operating across various state jurisdictions, such that attacks against them, in self-defense, 
cannot be limited to the territory of one state—Afghanistan. This is a “global war on terror,” 
even though the Obama administration is wary of the phrase, meaning sovereign state 
boundaries offer an inappropriate spatial framework. Where the “terrorists” are, is, 
essentially, a zone of armed conflict, and the United States is entitled to strike its enemies 
there.
48
 Niva notes how “in 2009, President Obama authorized the drone war to target anyone 
in Pakistan’s tribal areas it considered a potential threat, without authorization from outside 
the CIA as long as targets were in approved geographical ‘boxes’ near the Afghan border.”49 
It was, of course, the United States that decided where those boxes were to be drawn, and 
reserved the right to redraw them. 
Another spatial claim augments this logic, suggesting that where states are unable to exercise 
authority envisaged by the sovereign ideal, others may step in. If the local government cannot 
or will not effectively control terrorist groups within their borders, the targets of those 
terrorist groups may act, ideally with the permission and cooperation of the sovereign 
government, but, in extremis, unilaterally. This is summed up by the idea of “ungoverned 
areas”: often referred to as “havens” for terrorists.50 Thus, Pakistani and Yemeni sovereignty 
is in doubt because their respective governments cannot or will not exercise effective 
authority in parts of their territory, to such an extent in the Pakistani case that the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan are routinely used by Afghani 
groups for operations against U.S. and other forces inside Afghanistan and elsewhere. 
Pakistan’s government, too, is targeted by such groups on occasion, while some elements of 
the Pakistani government, principally the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency, are alleged to 
collude with the Pakistani Taliban and elements of al-Qaeda for their own reasons.
51
  
As with the positive account of the discrimination, proportionality and force-
protection benefits of drones, the factual veracity of these portrayals is not the point at issue 
here. That they are common arguments seems uncontroversial, establishing the significance of 
space in debate about the ethics of drones. The nature of the space into which drones are 
deployed significantly shapes assessment of their ethical defensibility: as Grayson notes, 
‘targeted killing is a form of spatial management’.52 What just war analysis has largely 
neglected, though, is the nature of the space that drones create—as opposed to the legal status 
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of the airspace the fly in. This opens the door to more innovative and interesting accounts 
than dominant ones about sovereign space and ascription of the legal status of a zone of 
armed conflict. Again, some of the tools of critical political geography are useful in casting 
fresh light on our spatial constructions and metaphors. Targeted killing is not just a form of 
“spatial management,” it is a way of inscribing that space with ethical significance. This will 
enable me to integrate distance and intimacy, elucidating a neglected, but important, aspect 
of the ethical debate about the role of drones.  
 
DRONESPACE 
 
The distant intimacy of drones serves as a striking illustration of spatial flexibility.The space 
where drones operate is not just their immediate surroundings, spanning as that does 
thousands of miles between the operator in, for instance, Nevada and their target in Pakistan’s 
Swat valley and the drone’s service base in Afghanistan. As noted, weapons operators have 
been very distant from their targets for a long time. The space is more extensive, 
incorporating the virtual space of data streams that have brought specific, individual target of 
the drone to the attention of the operator’s commanders. It also includes the satellite systems 
that enable communication between operator and drone, making it extra-terrestrial, too. All of 
this is held together by a real-time temporality. The concept of “assemblage” has been applied 
to drones by Williams to show how drone operators can be understood as elements or 
components of a complex technological system.
53
 Similarly, Coeckelbergh points towards 
science, technology and society (STS) scholarship as stressing the networked construction of 
knowledge of the target.54 
What is most important from an ethical perspective about dronespace is asymmetry. 
As critical political geographers stress, and our brief consideration of space illustrates, space 
is a political concept rooted in and expressive of power relationships. The construction, 
possession, and utilization of knowledge within a spatial context that itself manifests power 
inequalities creates, enables and legitimizes a relationship that, in this instance, is 
distinctively, possibly uniquely, asymmetrical. Dronespace places all of the cards—every one 
of them—in the hand of the drone operator. Distant intimacy is ethically significant and 
problematic because it challenges some basic concepts typically deployed to establish, 
understand, and assess the ethical quality of relationships between human beings and the 
choices that are possible. Distant intimacy requires dronespace to establish and attempt to 
legitimise the distinct asymmetry of a relationship that is ethically unidirectional. 
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The first challenge is to the target’s autonomy. Autonomy is a major component of 
just war debates, especially during the last decade as more formal analytical philosophical 
work has become increasingly prominent.
55
 A shift towards analyses of just war categories 
and concepts rooted within a rights-based approach stresses how targeting decisions and the 
liability of those targeted are complex choices. “Role-based” accounts, such as Michael 
Walzer’s analysis of the combatant/noncombatant boundary, ascribe liability to lethal force 
principally on the basis of adoption of a role.
56
 This is challenged by rights-based accounts 
arguing that liability to lethal force must reflect something specific about the targeted 
individual: they have done something (or be imminently about to do something) to which 
lethal force is an appropriate response. This stresses the ethical importance of the autonomous 
choice of the individual to engage in activity that they know renders them potentially liable to 
lethal force. However, autonomy is retained, at least partially, in conventional military 
situations because humans may cease those actions through surrender or withdrawal from 
military operations.  
You cannot surrender to a Reaper.
57
 Within dronespace the target’s autonomy is 
fundamentally compromised. That is true, of course, for a B-52 bomber, Tomahawk, or MX 
missile, or a host of other weapons systems. Yet these do not claim the intimacy of drones—
the discriminatory precision based on enhanced intelligence gathering and personalized 
targeting. By making military operations personal, drones exacerbate the problem of less 
discriminate weapons systems that obliterate individual autonomy by their nature, by holding 
out a promise of precision that is a one-way deal. The drone deployer can exercise precision, 
ostensibly restoring the connection between warfare and individual culpability rights-based 
ethics demands for the use of force, yet this is strictly one-way. Ostensible respect for the 
target’s autonomy comes at the paradoxical price of removing their autonomy over their fate. 
They are targeted as an autonomous individual—a specific person—yet are denied the last 
resort of individual autonomy in warfare: the chance to surrender. This, therefore, is a more 
extensive objection on the grounds of radical asymmetry than is usually considered,
58
 which 
focuses on the moment of attack “the intuition … that killing someone in such a manner is 
profoundly disrespectful … such distance makes warfare seem too clinical or cold-hearted.”59 
As critical consideration of space highlights, it is not the distance between drone operator and 
target at the moment of attack that is ethically significant. It is the construction of four-
dimensional space in which the drone deployer claims authority over every aspect of the 
target’s life—past, present and future—and the information assessed to determine the 
moment and manner of its ending in a system to which the target has no access. While the 
intimate knowledge of target’s lives drone operators possess may restore some element of 
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their humanity in the eyes of the operator,
60
 it is nevertheless a humanity that it constructed 
solely and exclusively on terms set by the operator.  
Within dronespace, reinforcing the novelty of its asymmetry, the drone operator’s 
autonomy is enhanced by choices drones provide through data gathering and processing 
potential and the long-loiter capability that increases options over when to attack. That all 
data about the target is not subject to challenge by the target further compromises their 
autonomy. The target cannot intercede in debates taking place among the drone operator, their 
commanders, legal advisers and others about whether and when they are to die. Again, this is 
a difference of degree in relation to other weapons systems. The meticulous planning of fire-
bombing raids against Dresden or Cologne, for instance, allowed no moment of consideration 
for the views of their targets, but the indiscriminate and impersonal nature of such attacks 
marks the crucial point of departure from the intimacy of drone strikes and the highly 
personalized asymmetry of dronespace. As right-based analytical philosophy gains 
prominence in just war theory, the significance of individual autonomy and liability increases 
and the paradox of distant intimacy is more fully revealed. Respect for and protection of 
human rights is ostensibly enhanced by drone technologies via improved compliance with 
discrimination and proportionality. Yet, simultaneously, the rights-holding, autonomous 
human being underpinning the necessity for discrimination and proportionality is negated by 
the asymmetry of dronespace., extending far beyond the location and moment of attack, to 
include construction of a four-dimensional space in which the target’s autonomy is both 
personalised and removed. Uwe Steinhoff suggests that, for some, war has become ‘pest 
control’,61 and whilst the argument here is different from that underpinning the point 
Steinhoff critiques, the asymmetry it invokes is not wholly dissimilar: within dronespace the 
target’s autonomy is completely conditional on the decisions of the drone deployer.  
Reciprocity is a second ethical principle rewritten in dronespace. The physical 
invulnerability of drone operators shatters a commonplace element of conventional just war 
thinking, that is, the moral equality of combatants that establishes reciprocal 
acknowledgement of the distinctive position each occupies. Reciprocity manifests in various 
ways, most obviously via the combatants’ shared physical vulnerability. This need not be a 
narrow interpretation—the attacker is equally vulnerable to the attacked at the moment of 
attack—but it represents an intuition about war that those who participate are vulnerable and 
mutual vulnerability establishes a degree of reciprocity among combatants.
62
 Critics argue 
that any notion of war as a ‘fair fight’ is long gone and, in any case, it is morally correct to 
protect a just warrior.63 The extent of and respect for reciprocity is variable, of course, and 
collapses entirely on occasion, but the distant intimacy of dronespace renders this formulation 
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inapplicable. While the drone operator knows a great deal about the target and holds them in a 
position of immense vulnerability, the target cannot know anything about their interlocutor 
and the vulnerability they suffer arises wholly from the intimacy the technology the deploy 
creates, not in any way from the conscious intentions of the target. Reciprocity through 
mutual vulnerability is inapplicable.  
Not all just war theorists accept the moral equality of combatants. Jeff McMahan 
argues that combatants in an unjust cause are not the moral equals of those fighting for a just 
cause, and acts of violence they commit in pursuit of injustice are morally unjustifiable.
64
 
McMahan offers powerful arguments for skepticism about a critique of drones through the 
absence of reciprocity of vulnerability. McMahan’s argument, however, assumes that unjust 
combatants fighting for an unjust cause pose a real risk to the just warriors they face, but 
those unjust warriors may not invoke moral equality rooted in their right to self-defense in 
any efforts they may make to resist. In the case of drones, there is no possibility of intentional 
harmful resistance by the target. The right to self-defence that provides the bedrock of 
McMahan’s critique is effectively inoperable. While that does not fully refute McMahan’s 
point—the defenders of Hiroshima had no operational possibility of resisting the Enola 
Gay—it reinforces how the accumulation of differences of degree in asymmetry and the 
distinctiveness of dronespace consistently stretches the logic of just war categories and 
concepts to reveal the necessity of explicit critical consideration of spatial issues.  
The distant intimacy of drones represents the apogee and nadir of the individuation of 
military action. The apogee because strikes can target individuals subject to sustained 
surveillance drawing on multiple, sometimes real-time, intelligence sources, granting 
unprecedented insight into the target’s life. The nadir because the target’s autonomy as an 
individual is removed through the absence of meaningful participation in the process that 
makes them a target or the possession of any significant means of self-defense. McMahan’s 
rejection of combatants’ moral equality on the basis that those fighting an unjust war are not 
the moral equals of their just adversaries does not strip those unjust warriors of their right to 
self-defense should they come under unjust attack.
65
 Strawser’s argument for the duty to 
minimize risks faced by just warriors does not strip the right to self-defense against unjust 
attack from their targets.
66
 Both McMahan and Strawser, however, miss how dronespace 
necessarily precludes reciprocity: it strips from targets their right to self-defense as part of 
their incorporation into this novel spatial realm. In the case of signature strikes, it reduces 
them to data streams representing patterns of behavior suggesting potential future harm or 
“affiliation” with named individuals.67 
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Reciprocity can be considered more widely than this individualized account. Within 
dronespace, the social context that matters is the drone operators’: preventing attacks on the 
United States, its citizens, interests and allies by militant terrorist organizations is what 
counts. The context within which the target lives is a very distant secondary consideration, if 
one at all. The consequences for family life, education, social cohesion, religious observation 
and the health of civil society is unconsidered, yet substantially affected by drone 
deployment.
68
 Dronespace is culturally configured to preclude consideration of the wider 
sociocultural needs of targets, while predicated upon protecting the “way of life” of the drone 
deployers. As Shaw suggests, the moral superiority of a US way of life that must be protected 
is assumed and embedded in the permissive conditions of dronespace.
69
 Any alternative is 
neither imaginable nor permissible. 
Distant intimacy offers a better account of the ethical qualms many feel about the 
“unfairness” or “immorality’ of drone strikes. The invulnerability of drone operators as 
‘unfair’ is quite a common objection: the targets of drones are unable to defend themselves, or 
that such tactics are cowardly or dishonourable.
70
 Such objections are naïve. The notion of 
war as glorious, chivalric or heroic and that for it to be so there must be a code of honor 
between combatants who are broadly equal and who compete in something like a “fair fight” 
modelled on a duel is a historical relic divorced from the conduct of war in an industrial and 
post-industrial age. It seems doubtful that war was ever like that for the vast majority of its 
participants, and certainly not for almost all of the innocent bystanders caught up in its 
horrors. It certainly is not like that today. Asking political and military leaders to abandon 
technology that enhances force protection (definitely) and increases precision and 
proportionality (arguably) on the basis of chivalry is also unrealistic.
71
 The just war tradition 
is characterized by its willingness to engage with and reflect trends in military technology, 
strategy, and tactics, so it would be perverse if contemporary just war scholars were to take 
such a stand. Nevertheless, such intuitions do speak to deep-rooted and ethically important 
notions, such as the dignity and autonomy of the individual and the reciprocity of combat. It 
is through these that we can better grasp the nature of the ethical challenges of the distant 
intimacy of dronespace. The ethical excision of the human beings that are the targets of 
drones and their life-worlds is the most telling aspect of this space. 
 
ETHICS, SPACE, AND JUST WAR 
 
What would a spatial element of just war theory look like and where would it fit within the 
familiar categorization? Space, self-evidently, is not a prudential criterion, such as reasonable 
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prospects of success; nor an ethical principle analogous to just cause or legitimate authority. 
Spatiality is a condition of the possibility of ethics, not an ethic in itself. A spatial dimension 
to just war theory is not an add-on or augmentation of the familiar structure and criteria. 
Drones create a highly distinctive spatial relationship—distant intimacy—that is uniquely 
asymmetric. The paradigmatic space of just war theory—the battlefield—and the 
paradigmatic claim about the nature of war—Clausewitz’s analogy of the duel—are 
transcended in most forms of asymmetric war, but particularly so in dronespace. This is not a 
battlefield and it is not a duel. Those two basic claims about the nature of war create the 
possibility, and fundamentally shape the operation, of just war theory; but both are 
inapplicable in dronespace. The possibility of applying ethics to military action alters. The 
spatial dimension takes us beyond the implications for just war theory usually associated 
with drones.72  
Consequently, just war theory needs to engage with asymmetry in novel ways. Rather 
than accommodating within existing structures the challenges of discrimination within 
asymmetric conflict, or considering competing claims to legitimate authority by insurgents 
and non-state actors, dronespace creates a series of cumulative challenges to established 
logics. It is insufficient to add additional dimensions to the battlefield to create ‘battlespace’; 
or to augment, extend and enhance categories such as combatant. They continue to apply the 
basic metaphors and analogies of just war theory. This may explain why some argue just war 
theory is inapplicable or inappropriate – drone strikes are not acts of war, but extra-judicial 
executions. Some combination of criminal law and just war may appeal, comparable to 
defences of preventive military action through analogy with criminal conspiracy.
73
 Use of 
force short of war – jus ad vim – seeks to capture this combination.74 This approach, too, 
remains bound by conventional spatial debates, for instance over legal jurisdiction, that 
cannot illuminate the significance of distant intimacy. 
Space must be taken more seriously as a condition of the possibility of ethics because 
space is not neutral. As critical geographers have argued for two decades, how we understand, 
construct and portray space—including as “natural” or “neutral”—is political. Choices to 
utilize technological innovation in pursuit of military advantage are routine subjects for just 
war theory, but choices about understanding the space that technology creates are not. Drones 
help explain why this should change and how. The role of space in creating opportunities to 
more fully and effectively comply with established strictures of just war is one clear element 
of that. The intimacy drones create may enhance discrimination and proportionality – 
although not always – because of the specificity, precision and clarity of the space they 
create around targets. Within dronespace, the fog of war lifts, although always only in part, 
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creating a spatial realm in which, across thousands of miles, the operator comes almost 
face-to-face with their target. The illusion of proximity – lost through previous technological 
manifestations of distance – is restored by drones and granted a temporal extension that is 
unavailable through other systems, such as manned aircraft.75 This space is radically 
asymmetrical, explaining the illusory proximity it creates, because the target has no role 
within it. Their ability to exercise meaningful autonomy as a human subject and to 
reciprocate within dronespace is effectively nullified by the spatial relationship of distant 
intimacy. Drones agglomerate spatial factors just war theory accommodated singly, but in 
combination they reveal the extent of the spatial challenge facing just war theory. Portraying 
distant intimacy in these terms is to comply, at least broadly, with positive portrayals of 
drones outlined earlier in this paper.76 That is a conscious choice: taking seriously claims 
about drones as more ethical weapons enables a focus on the spatial dimension that is my 
principal concern. Bracketing out, in effect, debates over whether drones fulfil the claims 
made for them, which I have substantially reproduced, nevertheless downplays a crucial 
element of ethical assessment. However, that work operates within the conventional spatial 
logic I have argued drones transcend. Destabilizing the positive portrayal of drones through 
critique of the absence of conscious spatial analysis does not undermine more conventional 
critiques. It, hopefully, augments and enhances them. The critical trend in political geography 
counsels us to question and challenge political spaces concealed by conventional 
representations, as well as those revealed. The absence of a spatial dimension of just war 
theory means critical engagement with the distant intimacy of dronespace is necessary to 
uncover other ethically significant dimensions of the phenomena. Thus my claims do not 
comprehensively reveal the spatial dimension of the ethics of drones or the insights to be 
gained through an explicit spatial dimension within just war theory. 
CONCLUSION 
Distant intimacy is a durable and expanding phenomenon. The number of targeted killings by 
the United States has declined since 2012, but the number of governments investing in drone 
technologies and the capabilities of drones deployed by existing possessing states (and non-
state actors) are expanding rapidly.
77
 Integrating drones into wider ISR technologies and the 
growing autonomy of such systems reinforces the ubiquity of the spatial challenge. I have 
argued that the established, and implicit, account of space within just war theory is ill-suited 
to effective identification and assessment of the ethical challenges this form of violence 
represents. Space as a condition of the possibility of ethics is not neutral or natural, but 
constructed and highly political. Critical political geography offers useful tools for just war 
theory both to recognize and engage with the spatial dimension of drone strikes, helping 
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reveal the nature and extent of the asymmetry of the ethical relationship between operators 
and their target.  
War has always been a technologically mediated activity, and the ability of modern 
ISR systems to reverse the previously settled relationship between increased distance and 
reduced intimacy in itself presents novel challenges, such as the mental health effects on 
drone operators. What has not yet been so effectively understood, though, is how dronespace 
constructs the ethical subjectivity of targets in a way that simultaneously appears to hold out 
the promise of greater respect and protection for their rights through improved discrimination 
and proportionality, while simultaneously rendering them utterly, even uniquely, dependent 
for their subjectivity on the political, cultural, technological and military perspective of those 
who hold them in their sights.  
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